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Legitimacy as a Zero-Sum Game: Presidential Populism and the 
Performative Success of the Unauthorized Outsider  
 
This article is concerned with a common, and in recent years increasingly pervasive, 
trope of US presidential performance. Anti-establishment discourse (which also 
appears in the guise of anti-Washington or anti-Congress rhetoric), accompanied by the 
positioning of the speaker as an outsider to the political establishment, is so deeply 
rooted within US politics that it has been described as an innately American habit (Jaffe, 
1997) and a strong recurring tendency in US political thought (Hofstadter, [1964] 
2008). The emphasis of outsider status in public performances by presidents and 
presidential candidates has had enduring currency since the candidacy of Jimmy Carter, 
correlating strongly with historically low figures of public trust in government since 
Watergate.1 
 Despite its long history and current relevance, little attention has been paid to 
how outsider rhetoric operates performatively within an institutional system of 
representative politics. Political representation has been understood to operate 
performatively and through politicians’ public performances for some time (Saward, 
2014; 2010; 2006). Populism has more recently been theorized along similar lines 
(Moffitt, 2016). However, this article moves beyond previous scholarship to argue not 
merely that representation is a performative process but to offer a theory that explains 
how elements of what I call ‘mainstreamed populism’ cultivate legitimation in ways 
that circumvent how performativity is typically understood to function.  
Performances of mainstreamed populism explicitly position speakers in 
opposition to, rather than in alignment with, the established institutional authority that 
is usually presumed necessary for a performative utterance to be felicitous (see Austin, 
1962; Bourdieu, 1991). Instead of representing institutional authority, outsider 
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performances thus restructure the terms of legitimacy within a political system. This 
article argues that this performative restructuring encourages political audiences to 
perceive legitimacy as a zero-sum game played out between the self-styled outsider 
(i.e., the president or presidential candidate) and institutions of the federal government, 
most notably Congress. As such, when legitimacy is whittled away from established 
institutions and their officeholders through anti-establishment performances, it is 
conferred upon the populist politician herself instead. Legitimacy is then increasingly 
perceived in terms of a simplistic binary division of the political space into ‘people plus 
president’ on one side and ‘political establishment/Washington/Congress’ on the other, 
with one side perceived to be able to benefit directly at the expense of the other. An 
individual politician’s, or candidate’s, effort to cultivate legitimacy for herself thus 
works to detract from the legitimacy of the system. 
 The perception of legitimacy as a zero-sum game has important implications as 
contrasting requirements for effective campaigning and effective governing emerge: it 
will be seen that governing, like most real-life games, is antithetical to the simplistic 
set-up of the zero-sum game. The risk of pervasive anti-establishment performances is 
that they paint effective politics as antithetical to compromise, mutual gain, and mutual 
loss, as well as bringing about a state of affairs in which legitimacy is increasingly only 
legible for democratic audiences if claims to it are accompanied by the disavowal of 
previous institutional affiliation. While the competition between political parties in a 
two-party system has long been seen to play itself out as a zero-sum game (Frieze, 
2015; Niou and Ordeshook, 2015), the institutions of the US federal government 
operate interdependently. As these institutions come to be perceived as engaged in a 
zero-sum game, compromise is increasingly dismissed as undesirable and requirements 
for effective campaigning and effective governing diverge sharply.  
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‘Mainstreamed populism’ is used throughout this article as a shorthand to 
describe anti-establishment performances in US presidential politics that assert the 
superiority of the self-styled outsider who acts on behalf of ‘the people’ against the 
political institutional establishment, which is painted as corrupt. In 2008 and the 2016 
US presidential elections anti-establishmentarianism and outsiderness were particularly 
dominant themes, which is why these elections will be drawn on here for examples of 
mainstreamed populism. Before launching his 2008 presidential campaign, Barack 
Obama was pointedly advised that he could still run as an outsider to the Washington 
establishment. Because Obama had not yet completed his first term in the US Senate, 
both Harry Reid, then Senate Majority Leader, and former Senate Minority Leader Tom 
Daschle identified Obama’s appeal as a relative Washington outsider (Heilemann and 
Halperin, 2010, pp. 33–4, p. 70). The opposing McCain campaign pursued a similar 
message in presenting Senator McCain as a long-time maverick within the Republican 
Party, initially going so far as to consider Joe Lieberman, then a Democrat, as McCain’s 
running mate (Heilemann and Halperin, 2010, p. 353). In 2016, the imperative to run 
as a candidate that would stand up to the Washington establishment seemed to have 
become even stronger. In all three presidential debates, Donald Trump positioned 
himself as an outsider by suggesting that his opponent, Hillary Clinton, had had thirty 
years of ‘bad experience’ working as part of the Washington political elite.2 On the 
Democratic side, the leaked emails of John Podesta, Hillary Clinton’s campaign 
manager in 2016, show Clinton-Kaine campaign staffers struggling with Hillary 
Clinton’s status as ‘part of the system’, stressing the need to show that Clinton knows 
‘how much has to change’ (Greenberg, 2016), as well as Clinton’s ‘vulnerability to the 
authenticity attack’ and the need to criticize the incumbent Obama administration 
(Schwerin, 2015).  
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‘Mainstreamed populism’ is thus a style of public performance by political 
actors (see Moffitt, 2016), one that exists on a continuum ranging from performances 
that incorporate no elements of anti-establishmentarianism nor assert the speaker’s own 
outsider status to performances focused entirely and forcefully on these elements (see 
Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug, 2014; Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013; Deegan-
Krause and Haughton, 2009). This terminology is intended not to skirt over the 
differences in public performances by, say, Obama and Trump, but to isolate the 
commonality and pervasiveness3 of running as an institutional outsider and against the 
maligned political establishment as a significant factor in producing perceived 
legitimacy. 
By focusing on the paradoxically effective disavowal of institutional authority 
in performances of mainstreamed populism, this article extends recent work on the 
performativity of institutions. A good example is Sara Ahmed’s On Being Included 
(2012), which argues that certain institutionally authorized speech acts name 
commitments without enacting the named effects and therefore tend towards being 
‘non-performative’ (p. 117). ‘Non-performatives’ are read as if they brought into effect 
that which they name but are an institutional way of appearing to do something (combat 
institutional racism and sexism, for instance) without actually bringing that which is 
named into effect. These speech acts only appear to be performative and in so 
appearing mask the non-performative character of institutions.  
 Ahmed’s work complicates received ideas about performativity by positing that 
it is problematic to assume that felicitous speech acts translate seamlessly into action. 
The argument this article puts forth can be read as a complement to that position: I am 
concerned here with questioning the premise that the institutional authority of a speaker 
ensures performative success. Thus, in contrast to Ahmed’s focus on the performative 
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ineffectiveness of institutions, I want to explore what appears to be the high 
performative effectiveness of the institutional outsider. This article asks what it is about 
the disavowal of institutional authority that makes presidential performances of 
outsiderness an apparently compelling strategy. I will argue that the performative 
operation of such performances proceeds through a complex process of legitimation 
that involves multiple sources of agency situated outside of institutions as well as 
widespread political distrust. 
 In working towards a theory that captures the performative process through 
which mainstreamed populism cultivates legitimacy, this article first develops a 
concept of legitimation as a complex process that involves multiple sources of agency 
and cannot be reduced simply to the conditioning of political subjects through discourse 
or the autonomous judgement of political actors. I then explore how political 
representation and performances of anti-establishment outsiderness should be 
understood to function within the present de-democratized political landscape of the 
United States. The article concludes with a reflection on is at stake in politicians’ 
performances that work to performatively shift legitimacy in a way that suggests a zero-
sum game is being played out between an outside infiltrator and the established 
institutional structure of federal politics, arguing that the rhetorical evocation of the 
inter-institutional zero-sum game is incompatible with a political system designed to 
function much more holistically and cooperatively.  
 
The Performativity of Institutions and Perceived and Shifting Legitimacy  
The possibility for a performative speech act to be successful, or ‘felicitous’, is typically 
be seen to be tied to a number of conditions, notably the institutional standing and 
authority of the speaker (see Austin 1962; Bourdieu 1991). However, in the case of 
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public performances of mainstreamed populism it appears, paradoxically, that the 
disavowal of such standing and authority, coupled with the assertion of outsider status, 
can be performatively effective. As such, these performances cultivate legitimation not 
by representing institutional authority but by disavowing it.   
 To establish how this process of cultivating legitimation proceeds, the idea of 
perceived and shifting legitimacy must first be clarified. While concepts of legitimacy 
are typically sorted into normative, legal and descriptive variants, this neat separation 
risks obscuring the intriguing tension between objective and subjective dimensions of 
legitimacy. This tension is evident, for instance, in Bush-era War on Terror policy. 
Bush was (at least barring disagreement with the outcome of the Bush v. Gore Supreme 
Court case) elected according to the rules governing US elections and therefore held 
his position as US President legitimately. However, some of the Bush administration’s 
policy actions, particularly those taken in the context of the so-called War on Terror, 
were not subjected to established legitimation procedures. Bush’s anti-terror actions 
were nonetheless able to garner ‘vast popular legitimacy’ because the War on Terror 
rhetoric used by Bush administration officials exerted a significant affective impact on 
a large part of the American electorate (Anker 2014, pp. 110–1). As such, the 
subjective, emotive, and perceptual dimension of legitimacy was able to overrule its 
formal and objective dimension.  
 The concept of legitimacy developed here is designed to be applied to 
politicians’ public performances of and claims to their own legitimacy; as such, it brings 
together the perceptual and performative dimensions of legitimacy to rethink 
legitimacy as a dynamic and malleable concept that can both shape the perception of a 
political and institutional system and is at the same time shaped by people’s perceptions 
of individual politicians and the political class as a whole. My argument is that there is 
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an irresolvable tension between the capacity to shape and the inevitability of being 
shaped – or, in other words, between the agency of political actors, the agency of 
political audiences, and the force of a pervasive political discourse.  
 Typically, scholarship that explores how legitimacy can exist outside of or 
alongside the formal rules that govern state actions perceived as legitimate builds on 
Max Weber’s (1979) ideas about the belief-based nature of legitimacy in order to bring 
the malleability of how the terms of legitimacy are perceived within a political system 
into focus. Michael Saward, for instance, argues that while legitimacy tends to be 
thought of as a formal, timeless quality, it might instead be more fruitful to explore 
‘legitimation’, understood as an ‘open-ended process’ that aims to create ‘acceptance 
by appropriate constituents, and perhaps audiences, under certain conditions’ of 
specific would-be political representatives (2010, p. 144). Saward’s idea of democratic 
legitimacy as a continual process of interaction between politicians and political 
audiences naturally chimes with his argument that political representation should be 
thought of as a dynamic process of representative claim-making (Saward 2014; 2010; 
2006), to which I will return below.  
According to Saward, to garner legitimacy, a political representative must make 
‘provisionally acceptable claims to democratic legitimacy across society … for which 
there is evidence of sufficient acceptance … by appropriate constituencies under 
reasonable conditions of judgment’ (2010, p. 145, original emphasis). ‘Appropriate 
constituencies’ and ‘reasonable conditions of judgment’ are undoubtedly desirable 
(though difficult to judge objectively). But this definition brackets the possibility of 
unreasonable conditions of judgment, under which constituencies would presumably 
be manipulated by the social and/or institutional power of representative claim-makers 
and accept as legitimate representatives whom they would not be inclined to accept 
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under more reasonable conditions. Saward’s focus on the agency of political audiences 
is to be applauded;4  it nevertheless seems worthwhile to incorporate the force of 
discourse – as the possibility for less reasonable conditions of judgment – more directly 
into the conceptualization of perceived and shifting legitimacy. After all, Weber 
considered plebiscitary leadership derived from charisma as an ‘independent source of 
legitimacy’, essentially authoritarian, but capable, by undergoing a process of 
‘progressive rationalization’ to be transformed into the kind of ‘democratic legitimacy’ 
that Saward cites (Weber, 1979, pp. 266–7). 
In contrast to Saward, Elisabeth Anker’s Orgies of Feeling (2014) puts forth a 
concept of ‘felt legitimacy’ that posits that perceptions of legitimacy can be shaped by 
political discourse. For Anker, melodramatic political discourse, which radically 
simplifies and moralizes complex political problems, served to justify state actions 
taken by the United States during the War on Terror, as the American electorate came 
to widely perceive such anti-terror actions as legitimate in spite of the fact that many of 
them were not formally legal. Unlike Saward, then, Anker’s conceptualization of ‘felt 
legitimacy’ explicitly considers the force of discourse as mobilized by political actors 
seeking to influence political audiences; this is why her thinking around legitimacy is 
so valuable here. ‘Felt legitimacy’ brings together Weber’s focus on legitimacy as 
perception with Michel Foucault’s critique of legitimacy, expressed in ‘Society Must 
Be Defended’, as the cultivation of a specific subjectivity that is desired by political 
power and that both produces and is foisted upon political subjects. 
 Since the present article is concerned with questions of legitimacy, it resists the 
Foucault’s generalizing claim, made in his Collège du France lecture from 14 January 
1976, that, ‘Right must … be viewed not in terms of a legitimacy that has to be 
established, but in terms of the procedures of subjugation it implements’ (2003, p. 27), 
	 9 
Foucault’s focus here is on the power of discourse to condition individual subjectivities 
on a large scale and the implication is that questions of legitimacy themselves are 
negligible. The Foucauldian perspective is valuable because it can account for the 
possibility that audiences’ judgments of political representatives are influenced by a 
pervasive political discourse. However, while this limits the agency of political 
audiences in judging politicians, it seems unreasonable to assume – at least where a 
reasonably diverse media environment and freedom of the press exist – that such 
discourse would be able to fully determine the political subjectivity of audiences, in 
fact subjugating them under an apparently absolute power that nullifies their agency. 
Anker’s more nuanced proposition to combine ‘Weber’s claim that belief in legitimacy 
can be created by affective states mobilized by social forces’ with ‘Foucault’s claim 
that power and discourse produce legitimacy’, and thereby open up ‘a new claim that 
the affective states conditioning belief in legitimacy are shaped in part by political 
discourse’ (2014, pp. 117–8) is more productive for the present case. My point is, 
however, that a more nuanced view like this needs to be taken not just when studying 
policy like Bush’s anti-terror actions, but also when looking at politics – in other words, 
this view of legitimation can shed light on the struggle for power within representative 
democracy as well as the policies of a government that is already in place.  
As such, neither Anker’s concept of felt legitimacy, nor Saward’s application 
of Weber’s ideas about democratic legitimacy can be seamlessly applied to this article’s 
focus on shifts of legitimacy as enacted in performances of mainstreamed populism. 
Saward focuses on the struggle for political power in representative democracy. But his 
exploration of the agency political audiences possess in judging representative claim-
makers has to be nuanced by considering this agency alongside, and in tension with, 
the force of a pervasive discourse, as it otherwise appears as though political actors 
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were in a position to determine legitimacy with complete autonomy. Anker, by contrast, 
focuses on the policies enacted by a government already in place (and therefore 
presumed to be legitimate in its ability to exercise state power, even if this exercise 
does not follow established legitimizing procedures), rather than the politics of a 
struggle for power within representative democracy (as in election campaigns). 
 The shift from Anker’s focus on policy to my focus on politics is first and 
foremost a shift from potentially hidden power relations to an overt focus on who wields 
political power. Foucault’s emphasis of the justification of sovereign power in his 
lecture from 14 January 1976 is less applicable here. Foucault argues that, since the 
Middle Ages, the ‘essential function of the technique and discourse of right is to 
dissolve the element of domination in power and to replace that domination, which has 
to be reduced or masked, with two things: the legitimate rights of the sovereign on the 
one hand, and the legal obligation to obey on the other’ (2003, p. 26). But this masking 
of power becomes less relevant in the context of contemporary election campaigns, 
since these are, after all, an overt struggle for political power.5 Furthermore, in the 
contemporary moment, political trust in the United States is at such historic lows that 
constituents frequently perceive politicians as power-grabbing egomaniacs bent on self-
advancement (see Pew Research Center, 2017; 2015; 2014). This is why, in the 
democratic struggle for power, political audiences are not simply at the mercy of those 
elected into positions of institutional authority (and hence, invested with institutional 
and political power). Neither, however, can it simply be assumed that audiences are 
operating under reasonable conditions of judgment, however these might be defined. 
Instead, processes of legitimation operate through a complex, and complexly mediated 
and mediatized, interplay between those seeking power and those who might elevate 
them into positions of power. In this, political discourse influences the affective states 
	 11 
and political judgments of audiences, but in ways that remain at least theoretically 
contestable and open to interpretation, rather than simply cultivating political subjects 
that are at the mercy of those who dominate them.  
Because perceptions of legitimacy are created in the interplay of politicians’ 
performances, audiences’ reception, and the force of discourse, specific performative 
interventions can have the power to shift how legitimacy is perceived within an 
institutional system. To return to the my example of recent US presidential campaign 
rhetoric, I posit that, when seen through this lens, Barack Obama’s transformation, in 
2008, from little known first-term senator into the ‘collective representation’ that most 
credibly expressed the electorate’s hope and hunger for change (Alexander, 2010, pp. 
40-2), can be read as a function of a shift in the public perception of political legitimacy, 
rather than as a miraculous event. This shift might be seen to have intensified in 2016, 
when the electorate elevated an even more unlikely outsider, Donald Trump, from 
reality TV personality and nonserious challenger to the Republican presidential 
nominee and, eventually, the US presidency. If successful (or ‘felicitous’), 
performances of anti-establishmentarianism by presidential candidates who can 
credibly present themselves as political outsiders entail a performative shift of 
legitimacy away from established institutions and their officeholders and onto the 
populist politician herself. The felicity of this move would then seem to depend not on 
the politician’s pre-existing authority, but, paradoxically, on her (actual or successfully 
performed) lack of prior authorization. In other words, while, in Weber’s model, state 
actions perceived as legitimate are seen to be executed by formally authorized staff, 
political discourse has the power to rearrange the terms of legitimacy in such a way that 
such staff are no longer perceived as fully legitimate. Instead, outsiders with no prior 
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authorization might become privileged in the public perception as more legitimate than 
the functionaries of an institutional system perceived as corrupt.  
This performative restructuring of the terms of legitimacy runs counter to 
established ideas about performativity and authority. According to J. L. Austin, whose 
foundational work on performativity has been developed in different directions by 
Judith Butler and Pierre Bourdieu, a performative utterance not underpinned by ‘some 
previous procedure, tacit or verbal’ that must ‘have first constituted the person who is 
to do the ordering an authority’ will be ‘classed as a misfire’, because commands are 
‘in order only when the subject of the verb is “a commander” or “an authority”’ (1962, 
pp. 27–9). From the Austinian perspective, language is thus seen to express authority, 
rather than shaping it. Bourdieu’s work sharpens this position, stressing that 
performative felicitousness depend on the authority of the speaker, and that this is ‘an 
authority whose limits are identical with the extent of delegation by the institution’ 
(1991, p. 109).  
In contrast to Austin and Bourdieu, Butler has asserted that utterances 
themselves can through ‘the rehearsal of the conventional formulae in non-
conventional ways’, force a shift in the terms of legitimacy so that ‘an invocation that 
has no prior legitimacy can have the effect of challenging existing forms of legitimacy, 
breaking open the possibility of future [social institutional] forms’ (1997, p. 147). The 
performances of outsiderness that this article is concerned with run counter to the logic 
that emphasises the primacy of social power backed by institutional authority and the 
consequent delegation of the performative utterance to an epiphenomenal status. As 
such, the effectiveness of these speech acts seems to confirm Butler’s more dynamic 
theory of performativity. I posit, further, that the challenging of existing forms of 
legitimacy has an impact that can exceed each singular instance of political rhetoric. It 
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can shape how the legitimacy of the political system as a whole is perceived, turning 
legitimacy into a competitive zero-sum game. That is what is at stake in US presidential 
populism. 
If we accept both the importance of subjective perceptions of legitimacy and the 
possibility that performative speech might enact shifts in how legitimacy is perceived, 
then it becomes possible to argue that specific patterns of political discourse shift how 
audiences perceive legitimacy within a political system. In this, the success or failure 
of performative claims to legitimacy still depends, as for Saward, on the judgements of 
political audiences. Thus, for instance, it was up to political audiences to make the 
judgement that the first-term Senator Barack Obama performed the change message 
more persuasively than the long-time maverick John McCain did in 2008. While the 
cards were arguably stacked against McCain, because it is always difficult for a 
presidential candidate to follow an incumbent of the same party to electoral success,6 
this perception was not inevitable. It would have been within the realm of possibility, 
for instance, for the electorate to instead perceive Obama as an overly ambitious career 
politician and McCain as a tried and tested war hero. While audiences thus do retain a 
measure of agency, the larger point this article is seeking to make is that shifts in 
legitimacy enacted by populist rhetoric can turn legitimacy into a zero-sum game in 
which the dominant political discourse continuously subtracts legitimacy from 
established political institutions and incumbent officeholders and instead confers it 
upon political outsiders. While democratic audiences have agency in their judgement 
of individual political actors, it might therefore become increasingly difficult to 
perceive legitimacy as inhering within political institutions, to the point that the 
disavowal of affiliation with political institutions might, in the perception of most 
audiences, become a prerequisite for the successful performance of claims to 
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legitimacy.7 In other words, while performative utterances in political discourse have 
the potential to reorganize or contribute to reorganizing the terms of legitimacy, 
audiences might ultimately become predisposed to follow a particular, dominant pattern 
of perceiving democratic legitimacy, especially when populist rhetoric is pervasive. 
 
Populist Claims to Represent  
Mainstreamed populism is a strategy that cultivates legitimation through outsider 
rhetoric and anti-establishment discourse. As this section will show, this strategy 
promises to be particularly successful if it operates within a de-democratized political 
environment, where it further undermines the perceived legitimacy of the political 
system as a whole, precisely by stoking extant widespread distrust of the system and its 
functionaries. Anti-establishment outsider discourse thus works to performatively 
structure legitimacy in the terms of a zero-sum game: a political actor deploying 
elements of mainstreamed populism seeks to take legitimacy away from political 
institutions and to confer it instead upon herself, through the presentation of herself as 
an outsider who can purify the tainted system. 
 To understand how ideas about performative shifts in the perception of 
legitimacy apply to public performances by politicians, it is useful to refer back to 
Saward’s theorization of the representative claim. For Saward, politicians, as makers 
of representative claims, performatively constitute, or evoke, their constituencies by 
ascribing certain characteristics to them. The politician simultaneously constitutes 
herself as the ideal representative of the audience possessing the named characteristics. 
This mutual constitution of the speaker and her constituency on the basis of specific, 
usually shared, characteristics is the representative claim; it is performative because it 
interpellates both the constituent-audience and the politician-speaker (2006, pp. 301–
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6). What follows from this theory is that, in order to make a felicitous representative 
claim, the claim-maker needs to evoke her constituency in a way that resonates with 
the audience’s sensibilities. It is therefore imperative that the politician is able to tap 
into the audience’s prevailing political concerns and reflect these back to them in a way 
that offers a productive way forward. If a politician at this stage employs what have 
been identified as common tropes of populist-style performance – outsider positioning; 
anti-establishment, anti-government, or anti Congress rhetoric; the evocation of a sense 
of crisis; and/or breaks with the stylistic register considered to be appropriate (see, e.g., 
Moffitt 2016, pp. 41–50) –, we can presume that she is attempting to tap into an anti-
establishment sensibility that she supposes exists among her audience.  
 It is worth dwelling here on the empirical case for why anti-establishment 
representative claims might be particularly compelling to voters in the United States in 
the contemporary moment. In other words, we might ask how the current popularity of 
presidential anti-establishment rhetoric and outsider positioning in candidates from 
Obama, McCain, and Palin to Trump and Sanders might be seen to be playing into and 
adding fuel to an already extant tendency at work in US politics. If political conditions 
since Watergate have increasingly privileged anti-institutional and anti-Washington 
performances by presidents and presidential candidates while encouraging voters’ 
perception of such anti-institutional claim-makers as more legitimate and authentic than 
institutional insiders, then how might this speak to voters’ political aspirations and 
concerns?   
 Most conspicuously, presidential populism promises to reassert the voice of ‘the 
people’ within the political sphere. Obama’s 2008 campaign rhetoric against the ‘ways 
of Washington’ as well as later instances of rhetoric that stressed, for instance, the 
corruption of Congress by the gun lobby (see Obama, 2016), and Donald Trump’s 2016 
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campaign promise to ‘drain the swamp’ (see Donald J. Trump for President, 2016) were 
all expressed on behalf of ‘the people’ against a tainted political establishment that is 
perceived as having ceased to work on the people’s behalf. As such, these performances 
purport to re-democratize a previously de-democratized political sphere.   
 Scholarship has persuasively linked the de-democratization of the United States 
both broadly to the rise of neoliberalism since Ronald Reagan (Brown, 2015; Harvey, 
2007) and more specifically to the securitization of US policy since 9/11 (Wolin, 2008). 
With respect to the effect of neoliberal economization on political subjects and 
institutions, Wendy Brown has argued that ‘[i]t is difficult to overstate the significance 
for democracy of [the neoliberal] remakings of the purpose of both states and citizens’, 
since neoliberalization entails ‘the dramatic curtailment of public values, public goods, 
and popular participation in political life’ (2015, p. 42). Further, neoliberalism has been 
seen to bring about about the ‘destruction of public life and especially educated public 
life’ as well as the ‘marketization of the political sphere’ such that ‘it dramatically thins 
public life without killing politics’, though politics is rendered ‘unappealing and toxic’ 
(Brown 2015, p. 39). In addition, it has been posited that, following 9/11, as presidential 
power expanded and dissenting political views became increasingly more difficult to 
articulate, these developments appeared to be governed by ‘abstract totalizing powers’ 
rather than by the vision of strong political leaders such that, by obscuring its true, 
totalizing character, ‘significant change would then appear as a modest attenuation of 
previous tendencies’ (Wolin, 2008, p. 42, p. 44). Sheldon Wolin argues this has meant 
that ‘democratic myths … have become detached from democratic practice’ as the 
political disengagement of citizens has been increasingly encouraged and the United 
States has been turned into a ‘managed democracy’, where ‘[t]he political role of 
corporate power, the corruption of political and representative processes by the 
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lobbying industry, the expansion of executive power at the expense of constitutional 
limitations, and the degradation of political dialogue promoted by the media are the 
basics of the system, not excrescences upon it’ (p. 52, p. 287, emphasis in original). In 
sum, as neoliberalism de-democratizes political life, democratic government has been 
seen to become increasingly ineffective in working for citizens. There is thus a ‘strong 
emphasis of governance on consensus’, a palpable ‘hostility to politics’ and a 
privileging of managerial modes of governance that barely require the input of voters 
(Brown, 2015, p. 127).  
 In the United States, neoliberal de-democratization has been accompanied by 
the decline of trust in politicians and political institutions (Pew Research Center, 2015; 
Twenge, Campbell, and Carter, 2014; van der Meer, 2017), as well as by the 
mainstreaming of a kind of conspiracy culture that, stimulated by the rise of the security 
state following the Second World War and significant events like the Kennedy 
assassination and the Watergate scandal, ‘has permeated American culture’ as a ‘default 
suspicion towards the authorities’ (Knight, 2000, p. 31). Voter disaffection and 
disenfranchisement have thus been linked to effects of neoliberalization like the 
influence of corporate lobbyists and the increasingly managerial, dissent-averse, and –
at worst – creepingly totalitarian, mode of politics. At the same time, trust in institutions 
– particularly, but not limited to, government institutions – has eroded at the same time 
as negative partisanship has risen dramatically (Abramowitz and Webster 2018). All of 
this is evidence for the widespread disillusionment of voters with the possibility of 
effecting positive change through democratic institutions. 
 The currency of presidential performances of outsider status must be read in this 
context of de-democratization. As neoliberal managerialism has sought to limit 
dissenting political expression, the appeal of presidential populism might be seen as 
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indicative of an aspiration to re-insert dissenting expression and re-democratize a 
political system whose democratic character is now perceived as primarily mythical 
rather than actively practiced. As such, the appeal of presidential populism might be 
understood in terms of its offering a forceful reinsertion of conflict in reaction against 
consensual and managerial politics.8 This of course does not mean that populist claim-
makers, once elected to the presidency, succeed in or even work towards actually re-
democratizing the de-democratized political sphere. It does, however, serve to illustrate 
why performances of unauthorized, anti-institutional outsiderness might project a 
vision of re-democratized politics that is aspirationally desirable to voters in the 
contemporary moment.9  
 In short, then, as the electorate has become politically disillusioned, voters 
might see themselves more and more as standing in antagonistic opposition to the 
political establishment. This opposition between ‘the people’ and their perceived 
enemy, the establishment, is widely seen as a defining element of populism. According 
to Ernesto Laclau’s On Populist Reason, which attempts to account for populism in 
performative terms,10 such opposition performs a binary division of the political space 
when there exist among an electorate a variety of unmet demands that come to be seen 
as equivalent to each other, in a process by which they ‘constitute a broader social 
subjectivity’, which creates ‘a widening chasm separating the institutional system from 
the people’ (2005a, pp. 73–4). For Laclau, populism thus consists of ‘the unification of 
a plurality of demands in an equivalential chain’, the consolidation of this chain 
‘through the construction of a popular identity’, and ‘the constitution of an internal 
frontier dividing society into two camps’ (p. 77). This configuration, I posit, makes it 
possible for a representative claim-maker to mobilize the dissatisfaction and division 
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within the electorate in an attempt to garner legitimacy and become elevated into the 
position of populist leader. 
While Laclau asserts that ‘the symbolic unification of the group around an 
individuality [i.e., a leader] … is inherent to the formation of a “people”’ (2005a, p. 
100), On Populist Reason is less clear on how this leader is chosen or how one among 
many potential leaders might make effective use of rhetoric to be elevated into the 
leader figure seen as capable of representing the populist movement. However, building 
on Saward’s theory of representative claim-making, it is possible to shed light on the 
performative act that elevates a politician into a figure of identification for a populist 
movement. In using populist rhetoric, the politician taps into the existing anti-
establishment sentiment and both feeds and draws on the suspiciousness with which 
the institutional structure has already come to be viewed. The politician thus mobilizes 
the existing populist division of society into two camps, the dissatisfied people and the 
unsatisfactory establishment, for her own political gain. By presenting herself to the 
electorate as an outsider intent on infiltrating the tainted system with the intent of 
purifying it, the politician thus performatively constitutes herself as a credible 
representative of ‘the people’, as defined by their disillusionment with the political 
establishment. 
This sort of outsider positioning can be seen, for instance, in Obama’s campaign 
launch announcement: Obama’s statement ‘I know that I haven’t spent a lot of time 
learning the ways of Washington. But I’ve been there long enough to know that the 
ways of Washington must change’ (qtd. in Heilemann and Halperin, 2010, p. 74) 
conveys the sense that the speaker had gotten a glimpse of Washington’s political 
dysfunction but had not been indoctrinated into the system (yet) and was therefore eager 
to report back to the people on the dysfunction he had found. As a junior senator who 
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had yet to complete his first term, as the US’s would-be first black president, and as a 
candidate who built his campaign around the idea of ‘hope’ and ‘change’, Obama was 
able to persuasively channel the simmering populist division of society in his 2008 
election campaign. Thus, through the rejection of political institutions a sense of 
legitimacy was created, as the politician – Obama in this case – encouraged the 
perception of himself not as part of a maligned institutional structure, but as a separate 
personal, and therefore more trustworthy, entity. While running with a radically 
different policy agenda to Obama, Donald Trump arguably rode the same wave of 
disenchantment with the political establishment in his 2016 campaign and thus 
connected with key demographics even in previously tendentially Democratic states, 
such as Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Michigan, which proved decisive in the election 
and had previously been won by Obama.11 
If a populist representative claim is felicitous, then the politician making that 
claim is accepted by the people as their ideal anti-establishment representative. The 
development of the movement/constituency was thus aided by, but it also, crucially, 
preceded and was not wholly dependent on, the politician’s intervention in it via the 
representative claim. Following Saward, would-be constituents are in a position to 
make a judgement about whether or not a politician can credibly represent them. 
Equally, however, because anti-establishment sentiment precedes and is more 
pervasive than any particular representative claim made by a single politician, the 
populist discourse employed by this politician will be more powerfully resonant than 
discourse generated by any single individual in isolation could possibly be. When 
Obama ran for president in 2008, he had been preceded by George W. Bush’s foreign-
policy populism (Foley, 2007), Bill Clinton’s outsider appeal as a saxophone-playing 
showman who could feel people’s pain (see Herbert, 2016), Ronald Reagan’s indelible 
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antipolitics of ‘government is the problem’ (Reagan, 1981), and Jimmy Carter’s 
outsider appeal that asked for ‘an unusual kind’ of trust, one that ‘necessitated a leap of 
faith, a giving of the heart of to an unknown stranger’ (Glad, 1980, p. 367).12 In other 
words, the electorate have, since Watergate, come to expect presidential candidates to 
profile themselves in contrast to the political establishment. 
Thus, to a certain extent, it is possible to follow Foucault’s 1976 position and 
assert that the people’s subjectivity will already have been conditioned by a particular 
anti-establishment political discourse that now predisposes them to accept the populist 
representative claim. In effect, as people’s dissatisfaction with the political 
establishment has whittled away at the perceived legitimacy of political institutions, a 
politician’s representative claim that further denies those institutions their legitimacy 
can enact a further shift of legitimacy. Even as democratic procedures and legal norms 
remain in place, the risk is that, if a paradigm of mainstreamed populist performance 
persists, legitimacy might increasingly become legible through the disavowal of 
affiliation with democratic institutions, rather than through the affirmation of the value 
these institutions have for the people. The danger is that political audiences might 
perceive themselves as living in illiberal, corrupt, and undemocratic circumstances, 
with political institutions stacked against them, regardless of the actual degree of 
corruption or illiberalism. 
 
Legitimacy as a Zero-Sum Game 
It is important to stress that the kind of anti-establishment performance this article is 
concerned with only works when the populist politician in question can convince 
audiences to perceive her as an outsider to or at least a maverick within the political 
system. The relatively inexperienced Obama managed to do this successfully in 2008, 
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whereas McCain, who had been a senator since 1987, struggled in comparison. In 2016, 
Trump, who had never held public office, had the upper hand over Clinton, who had 
spent thirty years in public service. Therefore, if the politician in question can credibly 
perform her outsider position vis-à-vis the establishment and portray herself as part of, 
and willing to take action for, the people, she can then channel the prevalent anti-
establishment sentiment to benefit her campaign. Thus, the felicity of the anti-
establishmentarian shift of legitimacy away from the established institutions (whose 
perceived legitimacy had already been worn away) and onto the populist politician as 
a representative of the people’s movement depends not on the politician’s pre-existing 
authority, but precisely on the lack of prior authorization. Paradoxically, it is the 
outsider position – in combination with the skill with which it is performed – that 
confers to the speaker the credibility and social power necessary to assume the position 
of legitimate leader of the people against the establishment. 
Additionally, legitimacy is not just something political audiences perceive to 
inhere within individual makers of representative claims, but is constituted in the 
interplay between audiences, performers, and the force of discourse. As such, as 
performances of outsiderness structure legitimacy in the terms of a zero-sum game, 
these performances become increasingly legible as legitimate whereas the maligned 
political institutions are increasingly delegitimized. Since Watergate, and with 
increasing urgency in the last two presidential elections, US presidential candidates and 
presidents have tended solicit the people’s acceptance by maligning other institutions, 
especially Congress, and presenting themselves as contrasts to these institutions and as 
possessing a more direct connection, however virtual and/or illusory, to the people. In 
other words, they attempt to manipulate perceptions of legitimacy by rhetorically 
working to take legitimacy away from Congress and conferring it upon themselves.  
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This presents a sharp contrast to earlier patterns of presidential performance. 
Thomas Jefferson’s 1801 inaugural address, for instance, explicitly stressed the 
interdependence of the institutions of the constitutional order, as Jefferson confessed: 
‘Utterly, indeed, should I despair did not the presence of many whom I here see remind 
me that in the other high authorities provided by our Constitution shall find resources 
of wisdom, of virtue, and of zeal on which to rely under all difficulties’. The 
Jeffersonian model illustrates that, prior to the turn of the nineteenth century, the US 
president was felt to be legitimate because he functioned as one cog in the state machine 
and performed this role in public by presenting himself as the chief explicator the US 
Constitution (which, as a suprapolitical focal point, lent legitimacy to the political 
system as a unified whole) (see Tulis 1987).  
 By contrast, the perception pushed in anti-establishment performances is that 
the tainted Congress and the president, who is figured as its purifier, have diametrically 
opposed interests, so that one of the players may benefit directly at the other’s expense 
and both players cannot benefit at once: Congress is figured as wanting to go on in its 
present corrupt state, while the president/presidential candidate wants to cleanse it of 
its corruption. It is evident that both strategies cannot be successfully pursued at once. 
Diametrically opposed interests, one player benefiting at the expense of the other, and 
the impossibility of both players gaining if they are deprived of all or some of their 
strategies are properties of strictly competitive and, more specifically, zero-sum games 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, 2015; Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev, 2010, pp. 5–6). Thus, in 
populist presidential performance, legitimacy is configured in terms of the zero-sum 
game: institutions are pitted against each other and the perception of the political system 
as a unified whole is discouraged. 
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Of course voting itself, at least in a two-party system, can present itself as a 
binary choice in any case and election outcomes come down to clear winners and losers, 
especially if negative partisanship predominates and election coverage focuses on 
campaign strategy above all else. However, while election outcomes in a majority 
voting system might therefore also be seen as a kind of zero-sum game that plays itself 
out between two major parties and the preferences of voters (see Frieze, 2015, p. 224; 
Niou and Ordeshook, 2015, p. 139), these inter-party struggles are built into the system. 
In contrast to this, presidential rhetoric that denigrates Congress opens up different kind 
of zero-sum game entirely. In this game, the people are invited by the presidential 
performer to align themselves with the president as a political outsider against the 
political system more broadly conceived. Far from being built into it, this kind of inter-
institutional zero-sum game actually undermines the legitimacy of the political system.  
It should be noted here that most games that arise in practice are not zero-sum 
games, as it is far more common for players to ‘have both common and opposed 
interests’. For instance,  
a buyer and a seller are engaged in a variable-sum game (the 
buyer wants a low price and the seller a high one, but both want 
to make a deal), as are two hostile nations (they may disagree 
about numerous issues, but both gain if they avoid going to 
war). (Brams and Davis, 2017) 
Similarly, in US federal politics, if effective governing is the goal, then the president 
and Congress have to work together, as Congress needs to avoid presidential vetoes and 
the president needs the legislature to pass legislation in line with his policy preferences. 
While the players may not agree on all or even most policies they want to pursue, it is 
nevertheless clear that their actual situation is far from the diametric opposition of the 
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zero-sum game. This is especially the case because the configuration of the zero-sum 
game is incompatible with the idea of compromise, which would rather require the 
thinking underlying the positive-sum game (‘win-win’ situation) or, perhaps more 
likely, the negative-sum game (‘lose-lose’ situation).  
What this discussion of basic game theory points to, then, is the contrast 
between starkly divisive public performances and the requirements for effective 
governing: populist rhetoric evokes a picture in which it looks like the positions on 
either side of the central binary divide have opposed interests. In other words, if the 
‘people plus president’ win, then the corrupt establishment loses (or is replaced), and 
vice versa. Thus, in performances of presidential populism, one player’s successful 
strategy is figured as her opponent’s loss, and this configuration serves to shore up 
presidential legitimacy against an increasingly maligned Congress, which appears more 
and more illegitimate precisely as a result of the strategy by which the presidential 
player seeks to gain legitimacy through rhetoric that deprives Congress of it. As such, 
similarly to the educational institutions that Ahmed (2012) observes to be 
performatively ineffective in their resort to ‘non-performative’ speech acts, the 
institutions of the US federal government do not appear to function with performative 
effectiveness. Self-styled institutional outsiders since Watergate have been able to 
capitalize on this. Much like the melodramatic political discourse employed during the 
War on Terror which is the focus of Anker’s (2014) study, performances of outsiderness 
and anti-establishmentarianism serve to radically simplify the political space in a way 
that may be performatively effective in a political environment perceived to have been 
de-democratized. Ultimately, however, these performances paint a more starkly 




1 Having fallen to 36 percent in 1975, half the level at which they had been a decade 
earlier, figures of political trust that extrapolate to the entire US electorate (rather than 
looking at party splits) rose again during the Reagan presidency and to more limited 
extent in the later years of the Clinton presidency, but these figures have never again 
come close to a pre-Nixon level and have only surpassed the 50 percent mark once: in 
the aftermath of 9/11 (Pew Research Center, 2017; 2015; 2014). 
2 In the first debate held on 26 September 2016 at Hofstra University, Trump said, 
‘Hillary has experience, but it's bad experience’. In the second debate, held on 9 
October 2016 at Washington University in St. Louis, Trump paraphrased the point, 
saying, ‘But she’s been there for thirty years, she’s been doing this stuff, she never 
changed, and she never will change’. In the third debate, held on 19 October 2016 at 
the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Trump said, ‘I say the one thing you have over 
me is experience. But it is bad experience because what you've done has turned out 
badly’. Transcripts of the debates are by Politico Staff (2016a; 2016b; 2016c).  
3  For discussions of the mainstreaming of populism in Western democracies, see 
Mudde (2004) and Arditi (2007). 
4  In fact, Saward’s concept of the representative claim as open to audiences’ and 
constituencies’ judgment provides a more rigorous theorization of Jeffrey Alexander’s 
claim that the electorate elevates a successful presidential candidate into ‘a collective 
representation – a symbolic vessel filled with what citizens hold most dear’ (2010, p. 
18). Saward therefore usefully concretizes the connection between politics and 





5 One might also think back here to Eve Sedgwick’s persuasive argument that the 
Foucauldian project of unmasking the operation by which power conceals its 
domination presumes that ‘violence would be deprecated and hence hidden in the first 
place’ – a circumstance which, for Sedgwick, is frequently no longer given, partly as a 
result of influence of hermeneutics of suspicion (1995, p. 140). 
6 For instance, the National Constitution Center notes that ‘in seven of the last nine 
elections, voters have decided to switch the party controlling the White House when a 
candidate (or his successor) had won two prior elections’ (NCC Staff, 2013).  
7 In recent research on US presidential performances since Watergate, presidential 
speechwriters overwhelmingly cite the fragmentation of media environment, the 
oversaturation with political media coverage, media antagonism as well as audiences’ 
diminishing attention spans and entertainment-like political reporting as significant 
factors impacting their work (Peetz 2019). Moffitt identifies such developments as 
making it ‘increasingly difficult to ignore the pull of populism’ (2016, p. 77). 
Speechwriters moreover note the prevalence of running against Washington/the 
establishment/government and  suggest that ideological differences in the anti-
establishment rhetoric employed by Republicans and Democrats were not easily 
perceptible to political audiences, with one Bill Clinton White House speechwriter 
stating that ‘we’ll never get back to a place where, you know, collectively, people are 
willing to suspend disbelief in a politician for very long’ (qtd. in Peetz 2019, p. 217).  
8 C.f. Chantal Mouffe’s radical democratic theory on the emptying out of political life’s 
essential agonism in consensual politics (2013; 2005).  
9 Even if self-styled outsider candidates retain their outsider status while in office, 
however, this does not necessarily translate into a surge of public trust. The case of 
Jimmy Carter illustrates this. While Carter’s appeal as a post-Watergate presidential 
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candidate has been linked to the cataclysmic decline in political trust that followed 
Nixon’s resignation (Cannon, 1991; Glad, 1980; Hess, 2002), distrust in the federal 
government rose sharply during Carter’s presidency, capping at 70 percent in March 
1980 (Pew Research Center 2014). In other words, performances of outsiderness may 
be aspirationally appealing to a distrusting electorate, but have not proven to be a 
remedy for political distrust.  
10 Laclau’s theory of populism has provoked considerable criticism, not least because 
it conflates populism with politics (2005b, p. 47). Unlike for instance Jacques 
Rancière’s distinction between politics and the police (2010), which likewise defines 
politics in terms of its disruption to existing institutional structures, Laclau’s conflation 
threatens to narrow the scope of political enquiry. This is so because the conflation of 
populism with politics implies a) that all of politics should be analysable through 
Laclau’s theory of populism and b) that no other analysis would be either valid or 
productive. Moffitt objects to Laclau’s conceptual conflation on these grounds, 
charging Laclau’s theory with being reductive and empirically indefensible (2016, p. 
25; see also Arditi, 2007, p. 48, p. 58). Despite the reservations brought about by 
Laclau’s conceptual overreach, however, his theorization of populism on formal 
grounds can still be productively integrated into the present enquiry into populism and 
shifting legitimacy. This is so because, like Saward’s theory of representation, Laclau’s 
theory of populism embeds elements of performativity in the collective constitution of 
the people as an entity defined by its opposition to the establishment. This part of my 
theorization of populism and shifting legitimacy therefore builds on Saward’s ideas of 
politicians as makers of representative claims and Laclau’s ideas about the formation 
of populist elements within society to show how the performative elevation of a maker 
of representative claims into a populist leader can enact and exacerbate shifts of 
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legitimacy. To account for the appeal of mainstreamed populism in US presidential 
politics is, I posit, to think through the role of politicians who act within and upon a 
society with significant populist elements.  
11 For a quantitative view of the decisive role played by Michigan, Wisconsin and 
Pennsylvania in the 2016 election, see, e.g., Meko et al. (2016).  
12 George H. W. Bush’s presidency can, in this context, been seen as an extension of 
the Reagan administration, since Bush had served as Reagan’s vice president for two 
terms. Bush’s presidential campaign stressed his involvement in the Reagan White 
House and his commitment to continuing Reagan’s legacy (Knott, n. d.). Bush’s 
inaugural address (1989) reaffirmed this by opening with the statement that Reagan had 
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